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The Petition Process
for Designating Lands Unsuitable
for Surface Coal Mining Operations:
Extreme Solution
or Unnecessary Exercise?
By GREGORY R. GORRELL* AND MARK C. RUSSELL**
INTRODUCTION
The Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977'
(SMCRA or the Act) was passed by the 95th Congress and signed
into law on August 3, 1977, by President Carter. The Act estab-
lishes a nationwide environmental and land use program de-
signed to protect society and the environment from the adverse
effects of surface coal mining operations. 2 The definition of "sur-
face coal mining operations" contained in SMCRA includes the
surface impacts incident to an underground mine. 3
The Act contemplates separate interim (or initial) and per-
manent regulatory programs. The interim regulatory program
remains in effect in a particular state until the state's permanent
regulatory program is approved by the Secretary of the Interior
or until a federal program has been developed and implemented
for the state. 4 Until the Secretary approves a state program, 5 the
. Partner in the firm of Jackson, Kelly, Holt & O'Farrell, Charleston, West Virginia.
B.A. 1970, University of Cincinnati; J.D. 1974, West Virginia University.
.. Associate in the firm of Jackson, Kelly, Holt & O'Farrell, Charleston, West Vir-
ginia. B.A. 1977, Williams College; J.D. 1980, Washington & Lee University.
' 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (Supp. I11978).
2 Id. § 1202(a).
3 Id. § 1291(28) (A).
4 Id. § 1252(e). Section 503 of SMCRA sets out the procedure by which a state per-
manent regulatory program can be developed and receive approval from the Secretary of
the Interior. Id. at § 1253. Section 504 of SMCRA sets forth the procedure under which a
federal program can be developed and implemented for a state. Id. at § 1254.
5 The Secretary of the Interior has approved the permanent regulatory programs of
the following states: Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Ken-
tucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, New Mexico, North Da-
kota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia
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Federal Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement
(OSM) is the regulatory authority responsible for enforcing
SMCRA.6 Under the Kentucky permanent regulatory program,
granted conditional approval by the Secretary of the Interior on
May 18, 1982, the State Natural Resources and Environmental
Protection Cabinet is the regulatory authority. 7
SMCRA contains two interrelated procedures for determin-
ing, prior to mining activity, whether particular areas are suit-
able for surface coal mining operations. The first is the permit-
ting process, which involves the determination of the suitability
for mining of a specific site.8 The second is the unsuitability
designation process under section 522 of SMCRA. 9 This Article
will focus on the petition process for designating lands unsuitable
for mining and, specifically, on the failure of the existing federal
regulatory scheme to provide adequate due process protection to
coal operators and mineral owners whose property interests are
jeopardized by an unsuitability designation proceeding. By
focusing upon the problem areas in the federal petition process,
this Article will identify those areas in which states should adopt
stronger procedural safeguards in their permanent regulatory
programs.
In the two major petition cases to date, one in Montana l0 and
and Wyoming. See Washington Report, COAL WEEK, July 26, 1982, at 2. Ohio and Ten-
nessee have the most recently approved programs (August 10, 1982). See 47 Fed. Reg.
34,688 & 34,724 (1982).
6 30 U.S.C. § 1211 (Supp. 111978).
7 See 47 Fed. Reg. 21,404 (1982) (to be codified at 30 C.F.R. pt. 17). The Kentucky
permanent regulatory program was initially approved in part and disapproved in part on
October 22, 1980. 45 Fed. Reg. 69,940 (1980). On December 30, 1981, Kentucky sub-
mitted its revised program to the Department of the Interior. The May 18, 1982, approval
is conditioned upon the correction of certain deficiencies identified by OSM. See 47 Fed.
Beg. 21,404 (1982) (to be codified at 30 C.F.R. pt. 17).
8 For a detailed discussion of the permitting process, see notes 24-26 infra and ac-
companying text.
930 U.S.C. § 1272 (Supp. 11978).
10 See UNITED STATES DEP-r OF THE INTERIOR OFFICE OF SURFACE MINING, DECISION
ON PETITION TO DESIGNATE CERTAIN LANDS IN ROSEBUD AND POWDER RIVER COUNTIES,
MONTANA, AS UNSUITABLE FOR SURFACE COAL MINING OPERATIONS (Dec. 22, 1981) [here-
inafter cited as UNITED STATES DEFT OF THE INTERIOR DECISION]; MONTANA DEFT OF
STATE LANDS, DECISION AND STATEMENT OF REASONS- PETITION TO DESIGNATE LANDS UN-
SUITABLE FOR SURFACE COAL MINING (Dec. 1981) [hereinafter cited as MONTANA DEFT OF
STATE LANDS DECISION].
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one in West Virginia," the filing of a petition to designate lands
unsuitable for mining disrupted mine permitting activity for
more than a year and jeopardized development plans for several
hundred thousand acres of coal lands. In both cases, the petitions
were denied because the petitioners failed to present sufficient
evidence to support an unsuitability designation for the lands
covered by the petitions. 12 Thus, the mere filing of an unsup-
ported bare bones petition can place in limbo the development of
enormous tracts of coal land during the administrative study
period.
I. OVERVIEW OF THE UNSUITABILITY
DESIGNATION PROCESS
A. Section 522 of SMCRA
Section 522 of SMCRA sets forth three ways in which lands
can be designated unsuitable for all or certain types of surface
mining. 13 First, section 522(e) contains a per se prohibition on
surface mining operations in certain areas such as those within
the boundaries of national parks and other federal systems or
within specified distances from various facilities such as public
roads, parks and occupied dwellings.1 Second, section 522(b) re-
n See RECLAMATION COMMISSION OF THE WEST VIRGINIA DEPT OF NATURAL RE-
SOURCES, DECISION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS IN RESPONSE TO A PETITION FILED BY
WEST VIRGINIA RIVERS COALITION (Jan. 29, 1982) [hereinafter cited as THE RECLAMATION
COMMISSION DECISION].
12 See THE RECLAMATION COMMISSION DECISION, supra note 11, at 12; UNITED
STATES DEPT OF THE INTERIOR DECISION, supra note 10, at iii; MONTANA DEPT OF STATE
LANDS DECISION, supra note 10, at 2.
13 30 U.S.C. § 1272 (Supp. H 1978).
14 Id. § 1272(e). Section 522(e) of SMCRA exempts from the per se prohibition on
surface mining operations those operations deemed to have "valid existing rights." Id.
Valid existing rights exist where: (1) property rights were in existence on August 3, 1977,
that were created by a legally binding conveyance, lease, deed, contract or other docu-
ment which authorizes surface coal mining operations; and (2) the person proposing to
conduct surface coal mining operations on such lands either: (a) had been validly issued,
on or before August 3, 1977, all state and federal permits necessary to conduct surface
mining operations on those lands, or had made a good faith attempt to secure all necessary
permits; or (b) can demonstrate to the regulatory authority that the coal is both needed
for, and immediately adjacent to, an ongoing surface coal mining operation for which all
mine plan approvals and permits were obtained prior to August 3, 1977. See 30 C.F.R. §
761.5 (1981). See also In re Permanent Surface Mining Litigation, 14 ENV. REP. CAS.
(BNA) 1083,1091 (D.D.C. Feb. 26, 1980), affd, 617 F.2d 807 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
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quires the Secretary of the Interior to conduct a review of federal
lands to determine areas which are unsuitable for all or certain
types of surface coal mining. 5 If the federal lands review in-
dicates that in certain areas mining would be incompatible with
historic, ecological or other values, the Secretary is required to
withdraw those lands from mineral development. 16 Finally, Sec-
tion 522(a) of SMCRA establishes a petition process by which the
regulatory authority can designate areas on state lands as unsuit-
able for all or certain types of coal mining where mining would
conflict with other land uses or where other values are found to
be more important than mining. 7
Section 522(a) provides that for a state to assume primary
regulatory authority during the permanent program, a planning
process must be established to enable the state regulatory author-
ity to reach unsuitability determinations.18 As part of this plan-
ning process, each state must develop a data base and inventory
system of state lands to allow for proper evaluation of the capa-
city of different land areas to support and permit reclamation of
mining operations. 9
Under section 522(c), any person having an interest which is
or may be adversely affected is given the right to petition the reg-
ulatory authority to have an area designated as unsuitable for
mining or to have an unsuitability designation terminated. 20 Sec-
tion 522(a) mandates that the regulatory authority find an area
unsuitable for mining if reclamation "is not technologically and
economically feasible." 2' In addition, the regulatory authority
may, in its discretion, deem an area unsuitable for mining if it
finds that mining operations will be incompatible with state or
local land use plans, adversely affect fragile or historic lands, re-
sult in a substantial loss or reduction of long-range productivity
of renewable resource lands, or affect natural hazard lands,
thereby endangering life or property.22
15 30 U.S.C. § 1272(b) (Supp. 11978).
16 Id.
17Id. § 1272(a)(3).
1Id. § 1272(a)(4).
19 Id. See 30 C.F.R. § 764.13 (1981).
20 30 U.S.C. § 1272(c) (Supp. 111978).
21 Id. § 1272(a)(2) (Supp. 111978).
22 Id. § 1272(a)(3) (A) to (D) (Supp. H 1978).
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B. Relationship to Other Planning Processes
The legislative history of SMCRA indicates that Congress in-
tended the petition process for designating lands unsuitable for
mining to complement the other planning processes mandated by
the Act.o The most fundamental element in these planning pro-
cesses is the requirement that a permit application be filed and
approved by the regulatory authority before starting mining op-
erations.A Permit applications cannot be approved unless the ap-
plicant shows that reclamation as required by the Act can be ac-
complished and proves that the hydrologic balance outside the
mine area will not be materially damaged.go During the permit-
ting process, persons opposed to the proposed mining operation
are given the opportunity to file their objections with the regula-
tory authority.28 By design, the mine permit application review
process involves an exhaustive site specific analysis to determine
whether the proposed operation can meet the performance re-
quirements of the Act.
23 See H.R. REP. No. 218, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 95 (1977).
' The required procedures for the filing and approval of permit applications are set
out in 30 U.S.C. §§ 1256-60 (Supp. 111978).
25 Among the permit application requirements are: (1) technological assurance that
the affected land will be restored to a condition capable of supporting the uses which it
was capable of supporting prior to any mining, or higher or better uses; (2) assurance that
the operator will minimize disturbances of the prevailing hydrologic balance at the mine
site and associated off-site areas; (3) assurance that the operator will minimize distur-
bances of the quality and quantity of water in surface and ground water systems, both
during and after surface coal mining operations and during reclamation; (4) assurance
that the operator will contain or dispose of all toxic wastes, other mine wastes, tailings and
coal processing wastes; (5) assurance that all reclamation efforts will proceed in an en-
vironmentally sound manner, and (6) assurance that the operator will restore original con-
tours except as otherwise authorized, eliminate steep slopes and otherwise eliminate all
site specific impacts of the mine operation. Id. §§ 1257-58 (Supp. 111978).
26 SMCRA mandates that public notice and an opportunity for public comment be
provided in connection with the submission of an application for a surface coal mining
and reclamation permit. Id. § 1263(a) (Supp. 111978). Any person having an interest
which is or may be adversely affected by the proposed mining operation has the right to
file written objections with the regulatory authority and to request that an informal con-
ference be held on the permit application. Id. § 1263(b). Following the approval or disap-
proval of the permit application, the applicant or any person with an interest which is or
may be adversely affected may request a hearing on the reasons for the final determina-
tion. Id. § 1264(c). Such a hearing is governed by the requirements of the Federal Admin-
istrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 554 (1976). See 30 U.S.C. § 1264(c) (Supp. 111978).
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
Aside from the permitting process is the SMCRA requirement
that the Secretary of the Interior review all federal lands to deter-
mine whether any areas are unsuitable for all or certain types of
coal mining operations.27 To be eligible to assume primary reg-
ulatory authority during the permanent program, each state
must conduct a similar review of state lands. 28 In contrast to the
site specific nature of the permit review process, these state and
federal reviews are broad and consider all factors which are tra-
ditionally part of land use and resource planning.
Congress apparently intended the petition process for desig-
nating lands unsuitable for mining to fall between the site spe-
cific permit review process and the general federal and state land
use reviews. The legislative history reveals that the petition pro-
cess was designed as an administrative means for private parties
to request review of areas larger than mine sites where common
area-wide characteristics justify an unsuitability designation.29
C. The Petition Process
The administrative proceeding to designate lands unsuitable
for mining is triggered by filing a petition with the regulatory au-
thority. Once a petition is filed, the regulatory authority cannot
approve a permit application if the petition covers the area pro-
posed to be mined." On March 13, 1979, OSM promulgated
final rules relating to the petition process for designating lands
27 Id. § 1272(b) (Supp. II 1978). See text accompanying notes 14-15 supra for a dis-
cussion relating to types of federal lands considered unsuitable for mining.
28 30 U.S.C. 1272(a)(4)(B) (Supp. H 1978).
29 See H.R. REP. No. 218, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 95 (1977).
30 30 U.S.C. § 1260(b)(4) (Supp. H 1978). The federal regulations provide that any
petitions received after the close of the public comment period on a permit application
shall not prevent the regulatory authority from issuing a decision on that permit applica-
tion. 30 C.F.R. § 764.15(a)(7) (1981). For the purposes of the federal regulations, the
close of the public comment period means the close of any informal conference or, if no
conference is requested, at the close of the period for filing written comments and objec-
tions. Id. For further explanation of the process by which the opportunity for public com-
ment is provided, see note 26 supra. The corresponding Kentucky regulation sets the close
of the public comments and objections regardless of whether an informal conference is re-
quested. See 405 Ky. ADmiN. REcs. 24:030E (1982). In those cases where an informal con-
ference is not requested, the Kentucky provision allows a time period identical to the fed-
eral provision. Id.
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unsuitable for mining; the rules establish the minimum proce-
dures and standards to be included in each approved state per-
manent regulatory program.3 1 The federal regulations provide
that "[a]ny person having an interest which is or may be adverse-
ly affected" has the right to file a petition. 32 Rather than specify-
ing tests to limit who has a right to petition to have an area desig-
nated unsuitable for mining, the regulations merely adopt the
statutory language of section 522(c) of the Act. 3
The only information that a petitioner must provide in the
petition is: the location and size of the area covered by the peti-
tion; allegations of facts and supporting evidence which would
tend to establish that the area is unsuitable for all or certain types
of surface coal mining operations; a description of how mining of
the area has affected or may adversely affect people, land, air,
water or other resources; the petitioner's name, address and tele-
phone number, and identification of the petitioner's interest
which is or may be adversely affected.4
Upon receipt of a petition, the regulatory authority has thirty
days to notify the petitioner whether or not the petition is com-
plete., Although the regulatory authority may reject "frivolous"
petitions, the federal regulations fail to provide any standards for
determining whether a petition is frivolous.-" Once the petitioner
has provided all required information, the petition must be con-
sidered and acted upon by the regulatory authority. 37
Within three weeks after determining that a petition is com-
plete, the regulatory authority must circulate copies of the peti-
tion to, and request relevant information from, other interested
governmental agencies, the petitioner, intervenors, persons with
3 44 Fed. Reg. 15,341 (1979).
32 30 C.F.R. § 764.13(a) (1981).
3 See 30 U.S.C. § 1272(c) (Supp. 111978).
'4 30 C.F.R. § 764.13(b) (1981).
15 Id. § 764.15(a)(1).
'1 Id. § 764.15(a)(3). On June 10, 1982, OSM issued a proposed rule which would
provide a standard for determining whether a petition is frivolous. The proposed regula-
tion defines "frivolous" to mean that the petition or the allegations of fact supporting evi-
dence are trivial, insignificant or unworthy of serious attention. See 47 Fed. Reg. 25,278;
25,289 & 25,301 (1982) (to be codified at 30 C.F.R. § 715(a)(3)). See notes 101-04 infra
and accompanying text for a discussion of the rules proposed by the OSM.
37 30 C.F.R. § 764.15(a)(3) (1981). For a list of the information required to be pro-
vided in the petition, see text accompanying note 34 supra.
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an ownership interest of record in the property and other persons
known to the regulatory authority to have an interest in the prop-
erty.ss In addition, the regulatory authority must provide notice
to the general public within three weeks after determining a peti-
tion is complete to allow the public to submit comments and
other relevant information. 39 Once a completed petition has been
filed, the regulatory authority is required to compile and make
available for public inspection and copying a record consisting of
all documents relating to the petition. 40
Within ten months after a complete petition is filed, the
regulatory authority must hold a public hearing near the area
covered by the petition.4 The regulations provide that the hear-
ing must be legislative and factfinding in nature. Cross examina-
tion of persons testifying at the hearing is not permitted. 42 More-
over, the regulations provide that no burden of proof shall be
borne by the petitioner or any other party.43
Following the public hearing, the regulatory authority has
sixty days within which to issue a written decision on the peti-
tion. 44 In reaching a decision on whether to designate all or part
of the area covered by the petition as unsuitable for all or certain
types of coal mining, the regulatory authority must consider not
only the information presented during the petition process, but
also the information contained in the data base and inventory
system. 45 Prior to designating lands unsuitable for mining, the
regulatory authority is required to prepare a detailed statement
on the potential coal resources of the area, the demand for those
resources and the impact of an unsuitability designation on the
environment, the economy and the supply of coal. 46 The decision
-8 30 C.F.R. § 764.15(b)(1) (1981). Any person may intervene in a proceeding to
designate lands unsuitable for mining by filing allegations of fact, supporting evidence, a
short statement identifying the petition to which the allegations pertain, and the inter-
venor's name, address and telephone number. Id. § 764.15(c).
39 Id. § 764.15(b)(2).4 0 Id. § 764.15(d).
41 Id. § 764.17(a).
42 Id.
43 Id. § 764.15(a)(3).
44 Id. § 764.19(b). If no public hearing is held, the regulatory authority must issue its
decision within twelve months after receipt of the complete petition. Id.
45 Id. § 764.19(a)(1).
46 Id. § 764.17(e).
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of the state regulatory authority on an unsuitability petition is
subject to judicial review by a court of competent jurisdiction in
accordance with state law. 47
D. The Exemption for Substantial Legal and Financial Com-
mitments
Section 522(a) of SMCRA provides that the petition process
does not apply to lands on which surface coal mining operations
are being conducted under a permit issued pursuant to the Act or
where mining operations were being conducted on the enact-
ment date of the Act.4 Thus, Congress did not intend the peti-
tion process to be applied retroactively to existing operations. In
addition, lands are not subject to the unsuitability designation
process where "substantial legal and financial commitments"
have been made to mining operations on those lands prior to Jan-
uary 4, 1977.19 Unfortunately, Congress failed to set forth a spe-
cific statutory definition under which it could be determined
whether a coal company had made substantial legal and finan-
cial commitments to a particular operation.
The federal regulations adopted on March 13, 1979, define
the term "substantial legal and financial commitments" to mean
"significant investments that have been made on the basis of a
long-term coal contract in power plants, railroads, coal-hand-
ling, preparation, extraction or storage facilities and other cap-
ital-intensive activities." 50 Thus, the regulatory definition re-
quires both investments and commitments in capital-intensive
activities and a long-term coal contract. OSM stated that an
example of a substantial financial and legal commitment would
be an existing mine, not actually producing, but in a substantial
stage of development prior to production. However, OSM speci-
fied that the costs of acquiring mineral rights in the absence of an
existing mine alone would be insufficient to constitute substan-
tial legal and financial commitment. 51 By requiring a coal oper-
47 Id. § 764.19(c); see 30 U.S.C. § 1276(e) (Supp. H 1978).
48 30 U.S.C. § 1272(a)(6) (Supp. 11978).
49 Id.
50 30 C.F.R. § 762.5 (1981).
51 Id.
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ator to have a long-term coal supply contract in hand, OSM's
definition prevents many coal companies that have made major
commitments to particular operations (by entering into binding
legal and financial obligations) from qualifying for the statutory
exemption from the unsuitability designation process.
II. PROBLEM AREAS
The submission of a petition to designate lands unsuitable for
mining stays the issuance of mining permits in the area covered
by the petition for up to twelve months during the administrative
study period. 52 Because of costly bonding requirements, most
coal companies do not have sufficient capital to obtain a single
permit covering all the reserves the company intends to mine
prior to commencement of mining activity. Instead, many op-
erators obtain successive permits on relatively small tracts, and a
company could run out of permitted reserves during the adminis-
trative study period on an unsuitability designation petition.
Thus, the filing of a petition can have a dramatically adverse im-
pact on development plans for the mineral estate, even in cases
where the petition is eventually denied.
Because of the disruptive effect on the permitting process,
the petition to designate lands unsuitable for mining has the po-
tential for being used to further the goals of those who are philo-
sophically opposed to all surface mining activity regardless of
whether the mining operations are conducted in a responsible
and environmentally sound manner. It is not surprising then that
the West Virginia and Montana cases both involved environ-
mental groups supporting the petition and coal companies and
mineral owners who intervened to oppose it.54
52 See notes 30 & 44 supra for discussion of the procedures which the regulatory
authority must follow upon receipt of a petition to designate lands unsuitable for mining.
53 After a surface mining permit application has been approved, but before the
permit is issued, the applicant must file with the regulatory authority a performance bond
covering the area of land covered by the permit. 30 U.S.C. S 1259 (Supp. II 1978). The
amount of the bond must be sufficient to assure completion of the reclamation work by the
regulatory authority in the event that the permittee fails to complete the approved recla-
mation plan. Id. The minimum bond for the area under one permit is $10,000. Id.; see 30
C.F.R. pts. 800-07 (1981).
54 In Montana, the Northern Plains Resource Council, Tongue River Agricultural
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The primary legal issues which have arisen in connection
with the unsuitability petition process relate to the failure of the
regulatory scheme to safeguard adequately the substantial prop-
erty interests associated with ownership and development of coal
resources. The determination that lands are suitable or unsuit-
able for mining affects property rights which are protected by
the due process guarantees of the fifth and fourteenth amend-
ments to the United States Constitution. The magnitude of the
ownership interests affected by the petition process is even
greater as a result of the restrictive definition of "substantial legal
and financial commitments." ' ' Because the petition process can
result in the deprivation of property, it is essential that proce-
dural safeguards be provided to ensure fairness in the proceed-
ings before the regulatory authority.
A. Filing Requirements
The existing regulatory procedures extend the right to file a
petition to any person "having an interest which is or may be ad-
versely affected."56 This extremely broad criterion allows persons
whose interests are relatively insignificant, when considered
alongside those of property owners, to prevent mining activity.57
Protective Association, Tri-County Ranchers Association, and the Rosebud Protective As-
sociation joined forces against Burlington Northern, Inc., Montco, Nerco, the Mining and
Mineral Division of Mobil Oil Company and Peabody Coal Company. See UNITED STATES
DErr OF THE INTERIOR DECISION, supra note 10, at 3-4. n the West Virginia case, the
West Virginia Rivers Coalition filed a petition to have certain lands and waters of the state
designated as unsuitable for mining. See RECLAMATION COMMISSION DECISION, supra note
11, at 1. The petition was opposed by Island Creek Coal Company, DLM Coal Corpora-
tion, AMAX Coal Company and several other coal companies. See id. at Appendix B.
55 The restrictive definition of "substantial legal and financial commitments" is dis-
cussed in text accompanying notes 50-51 supra.
N 30 C.F.R. § 764.13(a) (1981). See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972),
where the Supreme Court interpreted the meaning of "adversely affected" or "aggrieved"
for purposes of the standing requirements of § 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA), 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976). In Sierra Club, the Court held that a party has standing un-
der the APA when the party can prove that he or she has suffered or will suffer injury, eco-
nomic or otherwise. 405 U.S. at 738. However, the Court also ruled that "a mere'interest
in a problem,' no matter how longstanding the interest and no matter how qualified the
interest is in evaluating the problem, is not sufficient by itself to render the [party] 'ad-
versely affected' or'aggrieved' within the meaning of the APA." Id. at 739.
57 See 47 Fed. Reg. 25,278; 25,287 (1982).
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Under present regulations, persons who assert that their aesthetic
or recreational interests may be adversely affected by future min-
ing activity are permitted, by the mere filing of a petition, to dis-
rupt the development plans of mine operators and mineral
owners who have tangible property interests that often extend
over thousands of acres. Because the mere filing of a petition
places the ability of property owners to proceed with planned
coal development in limbo during the administrative study
period and because an unsuitability designation may render the
mineral estate worthless, the regulations should require that per-
sons filing a petition have an interest which is commensurate
with those who will be adversely affected by the petition. By re-
stricting the right to file a petition to persons who have property
interests which are or may be adversely affected, the interests of
petitioners would more closely correspond to those of mine oper-
ators or mineral owners. 8
Under the present regulatory scheme, the information which
petitioners must provide in a petition is relatively minimal. Peti-
tioners are merely required to include allegations of fact and sup-
porting evidence which would "tend to establish" that the area
covered by the petition is unsuitable for all or certain types of
surface coal mining operations and a description of how mining
of the area has affected or may adversely affect people, land, air,
water or other resources. 59
In two cases involving petitions to designate lands unsuitable
for mining, the petitioners failed to provide sufficient evidence to
support an unsuitability designation for all lands covered by the
petition. 6° In 1981, the West Virginia Rivers Coalition (WVRC)
filed a petition to prohibit coal mining over a three-county area
encompassing 300,000 acres of coal lands. 11 In support of its peti-
tion, the WVRC relied upon data which related to past instances
"8 See id. On June 10,1982, OSM issued proposed regulations that would restrict the
right to file a petition to "any person having a property interest in land or mineral re-
sources which is or may be adversely affected." Id. at 25,300. See notes 101-02 infra and
accompanying text for further discussion of the proposed regulations.
59 30 C.F.R. § 764.13(b) (1981).
60 See THE RECLAMATION COMMISSION DECISION, supra note 11; UNITED STATES
DEPT OF THE INTERIOR DECISION, supra note 10.
61 THE RECLAMATION COMMISSION DECISION, supra note 11, at 2.
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of acid mine drainage at a few specific sites within the enormous
area covered by the petition. 62 The petitioners in that case as-
serted that the information collected at a limited number of sites
could be extrapolated to the larger area covered by the petition.
Although the West Virginia Department of Natural Re-
sources, the state regulatory authority, deemed the WVRC peti-
tion "complete" and not frivolous, the information provided by
the petitioners was insufficient to support an unsuitability desig-
nation. 13 Despite the fact that previous mining *activity had re-
sulted in acid mine drainage and resultant environmental dam-
age at certain sites within the petition area, the regulatory
authority determined that such evidence was insufficient to sup-
port a finding that reclamation of the entire petition area was not
technologically and economically feasible. 4 In its decision, the
West Virginia Department of Natural Resources emphasized that
the large geographic area encompassed by the petition and the
diversity of its terrain, geology, geochemistry and hydrology
made general area-wide conclusions about suitability or unsuit-
ability impossible.6 The regulatory authority also noted that, al-
though past mining practices had resulted in negative effects on
the hydrologic balance, the petitioners had failed to demonstrate
that reclamation was not technologically and economically feasi-
ble under contemporary mining practices. 6
In the Montana case,67 the Northern Plains Resource Coun-
cil, the Tongue River Agricultural Protective Association, the
Tri-County Ranchers Association and the Rosebud Protective As-
sociation petitioned the Montana Department of State Lands and
OSM to designate approximately 200,000 acres of state and fed-
eral lands in a two-county area unsuitable for surface coal min-
ing operations.6 The petitioners alleged that the petition area
62 Id. at 5,6&11.
3 Id. at 12.
'4 Id. at 11.65 Id.
6 Id. at 12.
67 MONTANA DEFT OF STATE LANDS DECISION, supra note 10.
68 MONTANA DEFT OF STATE LANDS AND UNITED STATES DEPT OF THE INTERIOR OF-
FICE OF SURFACE MINING RECLAmATION AND ENFORCEMENT, TONGUE RIVER, MONTANA,
PETITION EVALUATION DOCUMENT at iii (Feb. 1982) [hereinafter cited as TONGUE RIVER
PETITION EVALUATION DOCUMENT].
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contained highly sodic and salty soils and that insufficient salt-
free topsoil was available to bury the sodic and salty material,
thereby rendering reclamation infeasible. 69 In denying the peti-
tion to designate the lands unsuitable, both OSM and the Mon-
tana Department of State Lands stated that because the thick-
nesses of suitable salt-free topsoil varied greatly across the peti-
tion area, area-wide conclusions about the feasibility of reclama-
tion were not possible. 70 Both agencies concluded that the prob-
lem of saline and sodic overburden could best be addressed in site
specific evaluations of permit applications. 71
To restrict the filing of frivolous petitions and the resulting
burdens upon property owners and state regulatory authorities,
the procedural regulations should be revised to require a more
specific presentation of facts and evidence by petitioners. To
clarify the key issues and concerns to be considered by the regula-
tory authority during the administrative study, the petitioner
should be required to provide evidence for all lands covered by a
petition. In this manner, the areas covered by a petition would
be limited to those lands for which there is supporting evidence,
thereby minimizing duplication of effort between the petition
and permitting processes.
Although requiring a more specific presentation of allega-
tions and supporting evidence would accomplish much toward
restricting frivolous petitions, the West Virginia and Montana
cases suggest that the underlying assumption of the petition pro-
cess, that large homogeneous land areas exist, may be wrong. In
both cases, evidence did not exist to support an unsuitability
designation for the large areas covered by the petitions. 72 While
this may have been due to the petitioners' failure to limit the
scope of the lands covered by the petitions, it also may indicate
that large land areas exhibiting common area-wide characteris-
69 See UNITED STATES DEPT OF THE INTERIOR DECISION, supra note 10, at 5; TONGUE
RIVER PETITION EVALUATION DOCUMENT, supra note 68, at v.
70 UNITED STATES DEFr OF THE INTERIOR DECISION, supra note 10, at i-ii; MONTANA
DEFT OF STATE LANDS DECISION, supra note 10, at 2.
71 UNITED STATES DET OF THE INTERIOR DECISION, supra note 10, at 15-16; MON-
TANA DEPT OF STATE LANDS DECISION, supra note 10, at 3, 6.7 2 See THE RECLAMATION COMMISSION DECISION, supra note 11, at 12; UNITED
STATES DET OF THE INTERIOR DECISION, supra note 10, at ii; MONTANA DEFT OF STATE
LANDS DECISION, supra note 10, at 2.
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tics do not in fact exist. If this is the case, the petition process
would appear unnecessary because the determination of whether
smaller tracts within a larger area are suitable for mining is best
dealt with through the site specific review of the permitting pro-
cess.
B. Burden of Proof
OSM's procedural regulations for the review of petitions to
designate lands unsuitable for mining specify that "no party shall
bear any burden of proof" during the designation process. 73 OSM
chose not to assign to the petitioner the burden of proving that an
area should be designated unsuitable despite the fact that the sole
legislative history concerning the burden of proof assigns the bur-
den to petitioners. During the congressional debates on House
Rule 11500, a predecessor to SMCRA which contained language
identical to section 522(c), Congressman Teno Roncalio ex-
plained the designation process and stated that "the burden of
proof for unsuitability is on the petitioner not the regulatory
authority." 74
In explaining its rationale for not assigning a burden of proof
on any party, OSM stated that Congress included section 522 in
the Act to ensure that the planning process would be used to de-
termine whether mining would be compatible with other
values. 75 OSM explained that planning decisions are not made in
an adversary proceeding but are the result of professional opin-
ion, public participation and the weighing of resource values.76
Viewing the unsuitability designation process as part of a plan-
ning procedure rather than an adversary proceeding, OSM con-
cluded that it would be inappropriate to impose a burden of
proof on any party. 7
Although characterizing the unsuitability designation process
as a "planning procedure" may be accurate insofar as the broad
state and federal land review mandated by SMCRA is concerned,
73 30 C.F.R. § 764.15(a)(3) (1981).
74 120 CONG. REc. H20, 340 (1974). See 44 Fed. Reg. 15,000 (1979).
75 44 Fed. Reg. 15,000 (1979).
76 Id.
77 Id.
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the characterization appears incorrect in relation to the petition
process. Because the petition process has been used by those op-
posed to surface mining, the administrative proceedings more
closely resemble an adversary court proceeding in which the peti-
tion allegations are contested by those whose property rights will
be directly affected by the decision of the regulatory authority.
Therefore, the decision not to impose a burden of proof on the
petitioner appears to be based upon an incorrect perception of
the petition process.
The decision not to impose a burden of proof upon peti-
tioners also is contrary to the well established principle that the
moving party before an administrative agency has the burden of
proof. 78 This principle is incorporated in the federal Administra-
tive Procedures Act, which provides that, except where other-
wise provided by statute, the proponent of an agency rule or or-
der has the burden of proof.7 Since section 522 of SMCRA is si-
lent concerning the burden of proof issue, the petitioner, as the
proponent of an unsuitability designation, should be required to
carry the burden of proving the allegations contained in the peti-
tion.
C. The Needfor an Adjudicatory Hearing
The federal regulations require that a legislative hearing be
held after receipt of a complete petition. 8 The decision not to
provide for a formal adjudicatory hearing again appears to have
been due to OSM's failure to recognize the adversarial nature of
the petition proceeding. Viewing the hearing simply as part of
the planning process, OSM reasoned that cross examination
could be used to discredit and intimidate witnesses, thereby pre-
venting valuable information from getting into the administra-
tive record.8' In addition, OSM stated that since section 522 did
not specifically require an adjudicatory hearing, an informal
78 See Redmond v. United States, 507 F.2d 1007, 1011 (5th Cir. 1975); United States
v. Springer, 491 F.2d 239, 242 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 834 (1974).
79 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (1976).
80 30 C.F.R. § 764.17(a) (1981).
81 See 44 Fed. Reg. 15,004 (1979).
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hearing met the requirements of the Act.82
The reasons given by OSM in support of the decision not to
provide for an adjudicatory hearing appear to be after-the-fact
justifications. The agency made no reference to any empirical
data to support its contention that cross examination would be
used to prevent valuable information from being included in the
administrative record. On the contrary, cross examination of
witnesses could elicit more information than would be obtained
through mere presentations, thereby developing a more complete
record during the hearing.
The conclusion that an adjudicatory hearing is not required
to consider the issues raised by a petition fails to recognize that
significant property interests are involved and that an unsuitabil-
ity designation may result in a taking without just compensa-
tion. 3 The United States Supreme Court has interpreted the due
process guarantees of the fifth and fourteenth amendments to re-
quire a meaningful hearing when property interests are at
stake s4 The substantial property interests of coal operators and
mineral owners would certainly appear to require stronger and
more meaningful procedural safeguards than those contained in
the existing hearing requirements.
The nature of the particular proceeding must be considered
in determining whether statutory language specifying that a
public hearing be held requires an adjudicatory hearing.P Where
8 2 Id. Although OSM correctly stated that § 522 does not specifically require an ad-
judicatory hearing, a counter argument can be made that nothing in § 522 supports
OSM's decision to require a legislative rather than adjudicatory hearing.
83 For a detailed analysis of the taking issue, see notes 105-25 infra and accompany-
ing text.
84 Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972). Accord Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527
(1981). See also Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441
(1915); United States v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 227 U.S. 88 (1913); Londoner v.
Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908).
85 See Marathon Oil Co. v. EPA, 564 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1977). In Marathon Oil
Company, the Ninth Circuit held that setting effluent limitations under the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act required an adjudicatory hearing. The court reasoned that,
although the.Federal Water Pollution Control Act required only an "opportunity for pub-
lic hearing," the process was clearly "adjudicatory" because the factual issues relating to
whether particular effluent limitations are practicable for individual point sources would
frequently be sharply disputed. 564 F.2d at 1262. See United States v. Florida E. Coast
Ry., 410 U.S. 224, 251 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting); United States v. Allegheny-Lud-
lum Steel Corp., 406 U.S. 742,757 (1972).
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complex factual issues are involved which are sharply disputed
by the parties, questions can best be decided through a judicial-
type procedure with sworn testimony, cross examination of wit-
nesses and a hearing on the record.86 Since the allegations con-
tained in a petition to designate lands unsuitable are invariably
contested by those whose property rights are at stake, only a
trial-type adjudicatory hearing will ensure reasoned decision-
making and provide a meaningful administrative record upon
which judicial review can be based.
D. The Kentucky Program
Because the federal regulatory scheme establishes minimum
procedures and standards to be included in each approved state
program, 87 a state has the authority to provide stronger and more
meaningful procedural safeguards than the minimum procedures
provided for in OSM's regulations.m In the past, OSM has
demonstrated an unwillingness to allow states the flexibility to
adopt more stringent procedural requirements than those con-
tained in the federal regulations. For example, when the federal
regulations were first proposed, OSM received numerous com-
ments concerning the degree of formality required for the hear-
ing. In rejecting the suggestion that the state be given greater
flexibility to allow cross examination of witnesses and an adjudi-
catory hearing, OSM stated that the requirement for a legislative
hearing was necessary to provide for nationwide consistency.89
As the result of a court challenge to the federal permanent
regulatory scheme, 90 OSM has recently acknowledged that a state
88 See Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v. Castle, 572 F.2d 872, 876 (lst Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 824 (1978); United States v. Florida E. Coast By., 410 U.S. at 251.
87 See 30 C.F.B. § 764.1 (1981).
88 See In re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litigation, 14 ENv. REP. CAS.
(BNA) at 1093 n.14. Adoption of more specific information requirements for petitions
than those contained in the federal regulations may actually increase the level of environ-
mental protection by placing a greater burden on petitioners to identify with specificity
areas where mining is incompatible with other values.
89 Fed. Reg. 15,003 (1979).
90 See In re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litigation, 14 ENv. REP. CAs.
(BNA) at 1083.
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may provide additional procedural safeguards beyond those con-
tained in the federal regulations. 91 In addition, OSM has shown a
greater willingness to approve state regulations which differ
from their federal counterparts so long as they are no less effec-
tive than the federal requirements. 9 2
Although the recently approved Kentucky permanent reg-
ulatory program parallels the federal requirements in most areas,
the Kentucky regulations differ in certain noteworthy respects.
For example, the Kentucky definition of "substantial legal and fi-
nancial commitments" omits the federal requirement that invest-
ments be made on the basis of a long-term coal contract.9 3 How-
ever, the Kentucky regulations still specify that acquiring the
coal or the right to mine will not alone constitute substantial
legal and financial commitments.9 The Secretary of the Inte-
rior's May 18, 1982, approval of the Kentucky program acknowl-
edges that a long-term coal contract is only one way of many to
show substantial commitments. 95
The Kentucky regulations approved by OSM provide that the
decision of the regulatory authority on a petition to designate
lands unsuitable for mining may be appealed to an independent
hearing officer and that such a proceeding will be conducted as a
de novo formal hearing according to rules applicable to adjudica-
tory hearings.98 The adjudicatory hearing provided in the ap-
proved Kentucky program is in addition to, rather than a substi-
tute for, the legislative-type hearing from which the appeal is
taken. The administrative appeal does not stay the effect of the
decision made by the state Natural Resources and Environmental
Protection Cabinet following the legislative-type hearing. The
adjudicatory hearing provided in the approved Kentucky pro-
9' See 47 Fed. Reg. 21,422 (1982).
92 The OSM's willingness to approve state regulations which differ from their federal
counterparts is evidenced by the OSM approval of the Kentucky definition of "substantial
legal and financial commitments." See text accompanying notes 93-95 infra for an expla-
nation of the way in which the Kentucky definition differs from the federal definition.
93 Compare 405 Ky. ADMIN. REcS. 24:030E § 2(2) (1982) with 30 C.F.R. § 762.5
(1981).
9 405 Ky. ADMIN. REcS. 24:030E § 2(2) (1982).
95 47 Fed. Reg. 21,404; 21,422-23 (1982).
98 405 KY. ADMIN. BEGS. 24:030E, § 8(7) (repealed). For a discussion of the repeal of
the provision for a de novo formal hearing, see text accompanying note 100 infra.
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gram would permit the introduction of new information not
properly considered at the legislative hearing but which may
nonetheless be relevant.
In approving the Kentucky program, OSM viewed the appel-
late procedures as providing permissible additional procedural
safeguards.97 OSM reasoned that the Kentucky regulation was
not intended to weaken or alter the petition process." To the con-
trary, OSM concluded that the appellate procedure for an adju-
dicatory hearing strengthened and ensured the validity of the pe-
tition process. 99
Although the adjudicatory hearing provided in the approved
Kentucky program does increase the level of due process protec-
tion afforded coal operators and property owners, the two-tiered
approach is cumbersome and has the potential of being used to
further disrupt the permitting process. For example, although
the regulations provide that the administrative appeal does not
stay the initial decision of the regulatory authority, an appeal by
the petitioner from the denial of a petition may have the practi-
cal effect of continuing the stay on permit issuance until the hear-
ing officer reaches a decision following the adjudicatory hearing.
It is likely that the Natural Resources and Environmental Protec-
tion Cabinet will be hesitant to issue mining permits where the
decision not to issue an unsuitability designation is subject to ad-
ministrative review.
In recogniton of the practical problems surrounding the two-
tiered approach, Kentucky recently revised its approved regula-
tory program to delete the second tier adjudicatory hearing. The
deletion of the adjudicatory hearing provision was submitted to
OSM for approval as an amendment to the approved Kentucky
program on May 26, 1982.100 Since the Kentucky hearing regula-
tions are now identical to the federal regulations, it is highly un-
likely that OSM will refuse approval of the amendment.
97 47 Fed. Reg. 21,404; 21,422-23 (1982).
98 Id.
99 Id. Under the Kentucky petition procedure, the provisions for an adjudicatory
hearing are trigged only if a party chooses to appeal the initial determination by the reg-
ulatory authority. See 405 Ky. ADMIN. REGS. 24:030E § 8(7) (repealed). Thus, under the
Kentucky regulation, the unsuccessful party has a second opportunity to obtain adminis-
trative relief. See 47 Fed. Reg. 21,404; 21,422-23 (1982).
'0o See 47 Fed. Reg. 31,890; 31,892 (1982).
[Vol. 71
DESIGNATION OF LANDS
E. Federal Regulatory Reform
On June 10, 1982, OSM proposed rules which would amend
the existing permanent program regulations relating to designat-
ing lands unsuitable for mining and terminating unsuitability
designations. 101 The proposed regulations would give the states
greater flexibility in adopting increased procedural safeguards to
ensure that the petition process comports with the due process re-
quirements of the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United
States Constitution. Specifically, the proposed rules limit who
may file a petition and require more information to be provided
in the petition document.0 2 In addition, the proposed rules
would permit the burden of proof to be assigned to the peti-
tioner.0" Finally, the proposed rules would permit cross exam-
ination of witnesses testifying at the hearing. 104
III. THE "TAKING' ISSUE
The increased willingness of OSM to permit states to adopt
greater procedural safeguards than those contained in the federal
regulations will enable states to address many of the problem
areas in the existing federal regulations. In addition, the recently
proposed rules, if adopted as final regulations, would substan-
tially increase the protections afforded coal operators and min-
eral owners whose property interests will be adversely affected
by an unsuitability designation. However, even with increased
procedural safeguards, the significant legal question remains as
to whether an unsuitability designation might result in an un-
constitutional taking without just compensation prohibited by
the fifth and fourteenth amendments.105 This final issue, especial-
101 Id. at 25,278 (1982).
102 Id. at 25,287-88. OSM's proposed rules set forth two options under which a state
would be given greater discretion to require a more specific presentation of allegations as
they relate to the petitioner's described interests and to the criteria specified in SMCRA,
thereby clarifying key issues and concerns to be addressed by the state regulatory author-
ity.
10' Id. at 25,291-92.
1' Id. The proposed regulations contain two options relating to cross examination of
witnesses. The first would permit cross examination of persons testifying as expert wit-
nesses. The second would allow cross examination of any person testifying at the hearing.
See d.
105 The guarantee that private property shall not be taken for public use without just
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ly under the existing regulatory scheme, demands both a careful
analysis of the potential impact of the petition process on private
property interests and an evaluation of whether the unsuitability
designation procedure is reasonably necessary to the effectuation
of a substantial public purpose.
The United States Supreme Court has been unable to develop
any set formula for determining when private economic injuries
caused by public action amount to a taking for which compensa-
tion is required.10 However, certain principles that have
emerged from the Court's decisions are particularly significant.
In the 1922 case of Pennsylvania Coal Company v. Mahon,07 the
Supreme Court held that a state statute that substantially fur-
thers important public policies "may so frustrate distinct invest-
ment-backed expectations as to amount to a'taking." ,108
In the Pennsylvania Coal Company case, the claimant had
sold the surface rights to particular parcels of property, but ex-
pressly reserved the right to remove the coal thereunder. 0° A
Pennsylvania statute, enacted after the transactions, forbade any
mining of coal that caused the subsidence of any house, unless
the house was the property of the owner of the underlying coal
and was more than 150 feet from the improved property of
another."0 The Supreme Court found that the statute made it
commercially impracticable to mine the coal and, thus, had
nearly the same effect as the complete destruction of rights the
claimant had reserved from the purchasers of the surface land."'
The Court reasoned that "[flor practical purposes, the right to
coal consists in the right to mine it" and that "[w]hat makes the
right to mine coal valuable is that it can be exercised with
profit.""2 Consequently, the Courts held that the statute was in-
valid in effecting a taking without just compensation., 3
compensation is applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment. See Chicago,
Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 236 (1897).
106 Pennsylvania Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
107 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
108 438 U.S. at 126 (citing Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 393).
109 260 U.S. at 412.
'10 Id. at 412-13.
".. Id. at 414.
112 Id.
u Id.
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An unsuitability designation under section 522 of SMCRA
could result in an injury to real property interests similar to that
in the Pennsylvania Coal Company case. Because of its restrictive
regulatory definition, the exemption for substantial legal and fi-
nancial commitments might not be available to the owner of un-
developed coal rights where the coal rights have been severed
from the surface estate. 1 4 Where a property owner holds both
the coal and surface rights, it is arguable that there is some
reasonable remaining use of the surface even if the property
owner is prevented from developing the mineral estate. How-
ever, where only the coal is owned, an unsuitability designation
would eliminate all profitable uses of the property. The West
Virginia legislature has recognized this fact by providing that
coal underlying any land which has been designated unsuitable
for mining "has no value [for tax purposes] for the duration of
such designation."" 5 Although the unsuitability designation can
be terminated through the petition process, the unsuitability
designation may operate as a "red flag" to potential coal de-
velopers, thereby effectively rendering the property worthless.
Thus, an unsuitability designation "may so frustrate distinct in-
vestment-backed expectations as to amount to a 'taking."' 6
In the recent case of Penn Central Transportation Company
v. New York City," 7 the United States Supreme Court reviewed
its decisions relating to the prohibition on takings without just
compensation. Although the Court specifically reaffirmed its
holding in the Pennsylvania Coal Company case,"' the Court
also discussed certain principles that had emerged in subsequent
cases. The Court noted that it had upheld land use regulations
that destroyed or adversely affected recognized real property in-
terests where the use restriction was reasonably necessary to pro'-
mote "the health, safety, morals or general welfare.""' 9 Thus, an
114 See text accompanying notes 50-51 supra for a discussion of the restrictive defini-
tion of "substantial legal and financial commitments."
1'5 W. VA. CODE § 206-22(e) (1981).
116 438 U.S. at 127.
117 Id. at 104.118 Id.
119 Id. at 125. See Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188 (1928); Euclid v. Am-
bler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 390 (1926). The Supreme Court also has upheld land use re-
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unsuitability designation does not necessarily amount to a taking
for which compensation is required if the designation is reason-
ably necessary to the effectuation of a substantial public purpose.
To determine whether the unsuitability designation process
is reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a substantial public
purpose, both the general purpose of SMCRA and the specific
congressional intent behind the unsuitability designation process
must be considered. The primary purpose of SMCRA is to pro-
tect society and the environment from the adverse effects of sur-
face coal mining operations. 20 However, the role of the unsuit-
ability designation process in furthering this goal of environ-
mental protection is less than crystal clear.
There is no possibility of environmental harm occurring as a
result of surface mining operations until surface mining activity
begins. Before surface mining operations are commenced, a per-
mit application must be filed and approved by the regulatory au-
thority.12' Permit applications cannot be approved without a
showing by the applicant based upon site specific data that the
reclamation requirements of SMCRA can be met and proof that
environmental degradation will not occur. '1 The fact that a peti-
tion for unsuitability designation has not been granted does not
constitute a determination that a particular area is suitable for
mining. 20 Thus, even where an unsuitability petition is denied, a
mining permit application must first be approved by the state
regulatory authority. During the site specific permit review pro-
cess, the state regulatory authority will consider information
contained in the data base and inventory system which section
522 requires each state to develop.
The designation of lands as unsuitable for all or certain types
of surface coal mining operations does not necessarily mean that
surface mining operations will never be conducted on those
lands. Following an unsuitability designation, a coal operator or
strictions that prohibited the most beneficial use of real property. See Goldblatt v. Hemp-
stead, 369 U.S. 590, 592-93 (1962) (upholding zoning ordinance prohibiting further exca-
vation within town limits).
120 30 U.S.C. § 1202 (Supp. I11978).
121 See notes 24-26 supra and accompanying text for a detailed discussion of the per-
mitting process.
12 See 30 U.S.C. §§ 1257-58 (Supp. 111978).
123 See 44 Fed. Reg. 14,999 (1979).
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mineral owner can file a petition to terminate the unsuitability
designation.'l2 If the termination petition is granted, coal oper-
ators can then submit permit applications to the regulatory au-
thority for approval. Once again, if the permit applicant can
demonstrate that the reclamation requirements of the Act can be
met and can prove that damage to the environment will not
occur, the applicant can obtain a permit to conduct surface min-
ing operations.
Environmental protection is guaranteed by the permitting
requirements of SMCRA and neither the granting nor the denial
of an unsuitability designation petition will prevent mining oper-
ations on lands covered by a petition if an operator can satisfy the
requirements for approval of a mining permit. Therefore, it is
unclear how the unsuitability designation process results in any
greater degree of environmental protection than is provided by
the permitting process.
When the asserted congressional goals behind the unsuitabil-
ity designation process are considered, the substantial public pur-
pose which is effectuated by the petition process is not readily ap-
parent. Congress stated that it hoped to help the coal industry
avoid unproductive investment by identifying lands as unsuitable
earlier than would occur through the permitting process or the
broader state and federal reviews.12 By preventing unproductive
investment, Congress hoped to minimize land use conflicts which
often surround coal mining operations.'2
It is noteworthy that the goals asserted by Congress are not in
any way related to the goal of environmental protection. Those
reasons given by Congress appear to be justifications after-the-
fact rather than legitimate reasons for adoption of the procedure.
The asserted goal of helping the coal industry hardly seems re-
lated to any substantial public purpose. In fact, the diversion of
investments away from lands which are declared unsuitable may
actually be contrary to the public interest since changes in recla-
mation technology and economics may permit those same lands
to be mined in a profitable and environmentally sound manner
124 30 U.S.C. § 1272(c) (Supp. 11978).
125 See H.R. REP. No. 218, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 95 (1977).
12 See S. REP. No. 128, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 54 (1977).
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at some future date. The congressional desire to minimize land
use conflicts by the unsuitability designation process has certain-
ly not been realized. On the contrary, the petition process has
been used as a vehicle for creating land use conflicts rather than
resolving them.
CONCLUSION
A consideration of both the need for environmental protec-
tion and the asserted congressional goals in enacting the unsuit-
ability designation process fails to illuminate any substantial
public purpose to be furthered by the petition process. At worst,
an unsuitability designation may result in a taking without just
compensation. At best, the unsuitability designation process es-
tablishes an unnecessary procedure which fails to provide any
greater level of environmental protection than is presently af-
forded by the permitting process. Moreover, the West Virginia
and Montana cases suggest that the underlying assumption of the
petition process, that large homogeneous land areas exist, may be
incorrect. Although recent efforts to provide increased proce-
dural safeguards should be applauded, the significant constitu-
tional question presented by the taking issue and the apparent re-
dundancy of the petition process with the permitting process sug-
gest that congressional action to repeal the petition process may
be more appropriate than regulatory reform.
[Vol. 71
